8d Notice not filed in a timely manner. . .The primary issue in this case is whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to reinstate 42 economic strikers and violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by subsequently withdrawing recognition from their collective-bargaining representative and changing terms of employment. We find, in agreement with the judge, that the Respondent was not required to reinstate the strikers because the strikers had, under the express language in the loss-of-status provision of Sec-tion 8(d), lost their protected status as employees under the Act by reason of their Union’s failure to file a notice with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) as required by Section 8(d)(3).

We find further that subsequently the Respondent lawfully withdrew recognition from the Union based on a petition signed by an uncoerced majority of the unit employees, and changed their terms of employment. Read the entire decision . . .

The use of company email for union business . . .After careful consideration, we hold that the Respondent’s employees have no statutory right to use the Respondent’s e-mail system for Section 7 purposes. We therefore find that the Respondent’s policy prohibiting employee use of the system for “non-job-related solicitations” did not violate Section 8(a)(1).

With respect to the Respondent’s alleged discriminatory enforcement of the e-mail policy, we have carefully examined Board precedent on this issue. As fully set forth herein, we have decided to modify the Board’s approach in discriminatory enforcement cases to clarify that discrimination under the Act means drawing a distinction along Section 7 lines. We then address the specific allegations in this case of discriminatory enforcement in accordance with this approach.

Finally, we find that the Respondent did not insist on its bargaining proposal prohibiting the use of e-mail for “union business.” Therefore, we dismiss the allegation that the Respondent insisted on an illegal subject in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1). Read the entire decision. . .

“protecting employee freedom of choice on the one hand, and promoting stability of bargaining relationships on the other.”. . .Metaldyne Corporation and Dana Corporation (the Employers) independently entered into separate neutrality and card-check agreements with the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL–CIO. Subsequently, the Employers recognized the Union upon a showing of majority support of the respective unit employees. Shortly after the Employers’ recognition of the Union (22 days for the Metaldyne unit and 34 days for the Dana unit), employees in each unit filed a petition seeking a decertification election. The Metaldyne petitions were supported by over 50 percent of the unit employees, while the Dana petition was supported by over 35 percent of the unit employees. The Regional Director for Region 6 and the Regional Director for Region 8 dismissed the Metaldyne and Dana petitions, respectively, based on an application of the Board’s recognition- bar doctrine. According to this doctrine, an employer’s voluntary recognition of a union, in good faith and based on a demonstrated majority status, immediately bars an election petition filed by an employee or a rival union for a reasonable period of time. A collectivebargaining agreement executed during this insulated period generally bars Board elections for up to 3 years of the new contract’s term.

The Petitioners filed timely requests for review of the Regional Directors’ dismissals.1 Through their petitions, the employees sought a change in Board law in order to permit them to express their views, either for or against unionization, in a decertification election. Read the entire decision. . .